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Abstract
This article examines the U.S. response to global terrorism and its
campaign in Afghanistan from 2001 to today. The aim of this article is
first to understand the fallacies, missteps, and misunderstandings of the
U.S. approach in Afghanistan. Second, the analysis evaluates the lessons
learnt and some possible strategies for achieving long-term stability and
security in Afghanistan. In particular, the analysis focuses on the
different strategies adopted by the United States and their achievements.
Despite a first victory over the Taliban regime, the initial approach was
focused on the enemy only and it lacked long-term planning, paving the
way to an insurgent movement against the U.S. presence in Afghanistan.
Then, in 2003 the U.S. strategy started to focus on the population,
government institutions, and local support. This shift involved a
significant change in tactics and operations and achieved positive results
from 2003 to 2005. However, since 2005 the situation has deteriorated,
casualties have increased and both the Taliban and al-Qaida have
gathered strength. Despite the injection of new troops, the U.S. and
coalition forces have not find a way to stabilize the country yet. The
defeat of al-Qaida and the stability of Afghanistan are, therefore, far from
being achieved.
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U.S. Response to Terrorism: A 
Strategic Analysis of the 
Afghanistan Campaign
By Valentina Taddeo
"If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not to fear the 
result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for 
every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither 
the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle."
—Sun Tzu, The Art of War, 1963
Introduction
When the United States declared war against terror on October 7, 2001, 
they labelled as "terrorism" a universal enemy against whom all the civi-
lized nations would have fought. The principal objective of the U.S. inter-
vention was al-Qaida, and its bases in Afghanistan, protected by the 
Taliban regime, were the target of U.S. air strikes. Since then, the U.S. 
campaign in Afghanistan has adopted different strategies, from a counter-
terrorist approach focused on the enemy to a counterinsurgency approach 
focused on the population.1 However, after eight years of confrontation 
and seven years after the collapse of the Taliban regime, al-Qaida is far 
from being defeated. The Taliban still have a strong influence, terrorism is 
a daily threat, and Afghanistan is neither stable nor secure. During these 
eight years, the U.S. strategy has tried to adapt itself to a changing threat 
scenario. The U.S. intervention in Afghanistan has made some progress 
but it has failed to understand the problems that the intervention itself 
has generated and to counter the threat with a proper strategy.
This article examines the U.S. response to global terrorism and its cam-
paign in Afghanistan from 2001 to today. The aim of this article is first to 
understand the fallacies, missteps, and misunderstandings of the U.S. 
approach in Afghanistan. Second, the analysis evaluates the lessons learnt 
and some possible strategies for achieving long-term stability and security 
in Afghanistan. In particular, the analysis focuses on the different strate-
gies adopted by the United States and their achievements. Despite a first 
victory over the Taliban regime, the initial approach was focused on the 
enemy only and it lacked long-term planning, paving the way to an insur-
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gent movement against the U.S. presence in Afghanistan. Then, in 2003 
the U.S. strategy started to focus on the population, government institu-
tions, and local support. This shift involved a significant change in tactics 
and operations and achieved positive results from 2003 to 2005. How-
ever, since 2005 the situation has deteriorated, casualties have increased 
and both the Taliban and al-Qaida have gathered strength. Despite the 
injection of new troops, the U.S. and coalition forces have not find a way 
to stabilize the country yet. The defeat of al-Qaida and the stability of 
Afghanistan are, therefore, far from being achieved.
Global Terrorism: Al-Qaida
The first problem when dealing with terrorism is how to best define what 
it is and how it is perceived. Many scholars describe terrorism as the "sus-
tained use, or threat of use, of violence by a small group for political pur-
poses such as inspiring fear, drawing widespread attention to a political 
grievance and/or provoking a draconian or unsustainable response."2 
According to this definition, the 9/11 attacks against the United States can 
be labelled as acts of terrorism. However, the attacks on the United States 
revealed a different facet of terrorism. It is no longer a small group acting 
to attract attention, but an international network of affiliated extremist 
groups whose principal object is to inflict mass casualties.3 Al-Qaida seeks 
to overthrow the current world order, characterised by the primacy of the 
United States. Therefore, al-Qaida is best understood as an "extremely 
large-scale, transnational globalised insurgency rather than as a tradi-
tional terrorism problem."4 The difference between terrorist groups and 
insurgents lies in their different objectives: while the first uses violence to 
draw attention, the second aims at "overthrowing the political order 
within a given territory, using a combination of subversion, terrorism, 
guerrilla warfare, and propaganda."5
In his speech soon after 9/11, the U.S. President George W. Bush con-
demned al-Qaida for the attacks and called upon the Taliban to deliver all 
the leaders of al-Qaida hidden in Afghanistan, as this was the movement's 
main base. The United States then declared War on Terror arguing that 
terrorism was a common enemy to all civilized nations.6 This claim was 
intended to raise support from all the Western countries and to launch a 
global crusade against all terrorist movements linked to al-Qaida. It was 
also aimed at obtaining the United Nation's approval and support for the 
intervention. However, a war against global terrorism that "will not end 
until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and 
defeated"7 is unlikely to be achieved, since there will always be a certain 
degree of terrorism in the world. Take for example crime, which can be 
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decreased by strong policing but not completely eliminated; so also ter-
rorism can be subdued but not completely defeated.8 The first aim of the 
War on Terror was, thus, far from being reached even with an effective 
military campaign. Nevertheless, strikes against al-Qaida training camps 
and military installations of the Taliban regime began on October 7, 2001 
as the Taliban refused to collaborate with the United States.9
U.S. Strategy Against Terrorism: The Case of 
Afghanistan
The new terrorist threat against the United States called for new tactics 
and strategies to achieve key objectives including: "the disruption of the 
use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations, and the attack to the 
military capability of the Taliban regime."10 An effective and comprehen-
sive counterterrorist strategy to counter al-Qaida and the Taliban regime 
was built by combining military action, law enforcement, the freezing of 
financial assets and repeated drives for international cooperation.11 The 
use of tactical aircraft armed with new generation weapons gave the 
United States a consistent and immediate advantage in the battlefield.12 
Moreover, the U.S. military made its commitment visible through the 
deployment of Special Operation Forces to gain support from the anti-
Taliban Northern Alliance.13 The Taliban resistance collapsed almost 
immediately; the initial campaign lasted less than two months and, 
thanks to the coalition with the Northern Alliance, compelled Taliban and 
al-Qaida members to shelter in the mountains in the eastern regions of 
Afghanistan.
The strategy applied by the U.S. military, a network-centric combined 
with an enemy-centric approach, resulted in a short-term victory only. 
The network-centric warfare was focused on attacking a handful of key 
targets such as communication lines or Taliban's training bases, but this 
was not enough to secure long-lasting success.14 The enemy-centric war-
fare drew attention to the enemy ignoring the population, the process of 
institution-building, infrastructures, and services for the local communi-
ties.15 Until 2003, the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan lacked a population-
centric warfare aimed at eradicating the social support for al-Qaida and 
the Taliban, building a strong and reliable government, and guaranteeing 
security to the population. In fact, despite the fact that the Northern Alli-
ance had established a new government in Kabul in June 2002, the 
majority of the population, especially the Pashtuns, felt excluded from the 
executive.16 As a consequence, the Taliban canvassed support from the 
Pashtuns and began to move back into Afghanistan. With the institution 
of an elected government, the Bush administration shifted its attention to 
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Iraq, confident in the stabilizing role that the new Afghan National Army 
(ANA) would have played in maintaining stability and order. However, 
this shift proved to be fatal as "the war in Iraq drew attention and 
resources before the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan had 
been properly developed."17
The lack of long-term planning had significant consequences on the 
resurgence of the Taliban. By May 2003, it had become evident that a 
resurgence of activity against the government and the U.S.-led coalition 
was operating not only in the eastern but also in the southern regions of 
Afghanistan. The U.S. strategy lacked a counterinsurgency approach and 
until 2003 did not do anything to counter the resurgence of the Taliban 
and al-Qaida. Instead of a nation-building approach, the United States 
focused only on gaining tactical victories on the ground, resorting to raids 
and deploying a small number of troops. The result was a separation of 
the coalition forces from the Afghan people. The major mistake was the 
misunderstanding of the causes of local insurgencies. They were moti-
vated not by ideology but by the lack of security and economic stability, 
tribal rivalries, coercion, and the perception of a corrupt government 
unable to exercise authority and to provide security.18
A change in the U.S. strategy finally began to take shape in late 2003 as a 
consequence of the increased resurgence of Taliban attacks on the U.S. 
military. The new approach was based on counterinsurgency operations 
to erode the Taliban's popular support and growing strength, which 
became the driving tactic in Afghanistan. The core principle animating 
the new strategy was the identification of the Afghan people as the center 
of gravity in the counterinsurgency.19 The main objective was 
maintaining popular support in order to prevent local insurgencies and 
coalitions forming with the Taliban and al-Qaida. Therefore, the number 
of U.S. ground forces was increased, as were the number of experts on 
Afghan culture and tradition. These experts and military forces were 
primarily engaged in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, in building 
relations with the local population, and in strengthening confidence in the 
Afghan Government.
The population-centered counterinsurgency approach also impacted mili-
tary operations. The number of air strikes based on technical intelligence 
decreased to avoid local unrest. The casualties among the population 
caused by air strikes were, in fact, one of the principal reasons for local 
protests against U.S. forces. Conversely, the increased engagement of 
troops on the ground helped engender support for the objectives of coali-
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tion forces. This shift in strategy resulted in a more stable operating envi-
ronment and increased local support both for the Afghan Government 
and the coalition forces.
Local Support Wanes: A Renewed Emphasis on 
NATO
However, all the achievements made up through 2005 began to fade away 
in a few months. As Lieutenant General David Barno highlighted, "Since 
2006 the Taliban and al-Qaida gathered strength, changed tactics, and 
increased their capabilities and attacks especially across the border in 
Pakistan."20 This step backwards was a reflection of the U.S. announce-
ment to withdraw 2500 combat troops and shift responsibility for military 
operations to NATO. This decision was perceived as the first signal of a 
U.S. disengagement from Afghanistan. Moreover, the Karzai Government 
and the ANA were not ready to provide security in many villages of the 
country. The United States' willingness to withdraw troops, together with 
the unpopularity of the government, created a vacuum that was quickly 
filled by insurgent groups. The Taliban's aim was to eliminate the govern-
ment's contact with the population, thereby discrediting the capacity of 
the ANA to provide order and security. By forcing the United States to 
take charge of local security, the Taliban portrayed the United States as a 
belligerent occupying force that sought to control and manipulate the 
Afghan Government.
The Taliban have since gained control of many villages in the Southern 
and Eastern provinces, but their presence is also strong in cities like Kan-
dahar and Ghazni. In these places, coalition forces are operating without 
the support of the local population and are facing many difficulties in 
maintaining stability and order. The situation is worsening in the regions 
along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, where al-Qaida and the Taliban 
continue to maintain a strong presence. This region is barely controlled 
by the Pakistani Government, and U.S. forces are running into many diffi-
culties along the border. As a result, despite some efforts the stability and 
security of the borders are deteriorating.21
U.S. Policy in Afghanistan Under President Obama
Under the Obama Presidency, the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan has 
undergone another change. In February 2009, President Obama 
launched a new approach based on what seem to be attainable goals that 
will hopefully be matched with adequate resources.22 The end game is to: 
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"disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaida and its extremist allies,"23 
although the U.S. commitment is primarily focused on protecting the 
Afghans, not to kill the Taliban among them. The new counterinsurgency 
strategy is aimed at pursuing judicial reforms, building good governance 
and a reliable police, and protecting civilians through a patrolling 
contingent in villages and towns to stop insurgents from intimidating and 
recruiting locals. General Stanley McChrystal, the new U.S. and NATO 
forces' Commander in Afghanistan, has called for a limited use of air 
strikes and for troops to be stationed and integrated with the locals. The 
nation-building approach and the commitment of more troops on the 
ground are aimed at countering the insurgency, while military operations 
are to be conducted in the border regions with Pakistan to defeat al-Qaida 
and the Taliban. As President Obama said, "This is not a war of choice, 
this is a war of necessity."24
President Obama proposed sending more troops not only to prevent al-
Qaida from re-establishing safe havens in Afghanistan, but also to prevent 
the country from collapsing and becoming the terrain of tribal fights.25 
On December 2, 2009, President Obama called for an infusion of 30,000 
troops within six months. Many of the troops will operate as trainers for 
the Afghan forces as a means to preserve stability and security once the 
U.S. troops leave. This increase in troops reflects a willingness to end a 
period of losses and stalemate, and to gradually shift the responsibility for 
the security of the country to the Afghan military. Ultimately, however, 
more U.S. troops in Afghanistan will be not enough to reverse the collapse 
of security in the country.
In the more recent "Afghanistan Conference" in London, the NATO coali-
tion and the Afghan Government proposed a "reintegration strategy," 
aimed at reintegrating the Taliban and the insurgents into the govern-
ment and civil society through offers of money. However, questions arise 
about whether the insurgents will be motivated to reintegrate. For the 
time being, every proposal and negotiation has thus far been rejected by 
the Taliban, whose only condition is the withdrawal of the foreign 
troops.26 Whether this strategy will prove effective is a matter of time: 
"counterinsurgency campaigns usually take many years, cost a fortune in 
blood and treasure, and end in failure."27
Lessons Learned
After eight years in Afghanistan, the U.S. troops and their allies have 
achieved neither stability nor security. Despite the prompt defeat of the 
Taliban regime in 2001, the local population felt alienated from the new 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 3, No. 2
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol3/iss2/3
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.3.2.3
U.S. Response to Terrorism: A Strategic Analysis of the Afghanistan Campaign
33
Afghan Government, which was perceived as corrupt and weak. Strategies 
applied by U.S. troops did not always yield positive results. In particular, 
the lack of a prompt and effective counterinsurgency campaign, the exten-
sive use of air strikes, and the lack of contact with the local population 
nullified most military efforts and achievements. Many lessons can be 
learnt from the U.S. approach to Afghanistan and many changes should 
be implemented to attain the initial objectives.
First, in order to prevent al-Qaida from re-establishing safe havens in 
Afghanistan, it is necessary to stabilize the country. Stability, however, is 
closely linked to a strong, reliable, and efficient government, a crucial ele-
ment that Afghanistan still lacks. Moreover, the ANA is still not able to 
provide security by itself and it, therefore, relies on foreign militaries for 
maintaining order and delivering services to the population. However, the 
longer U.S. troops remain in Afghanistan, the more concerned the local 
population will likely remain, since the U.S. presence is perceived as a 
source of instability and as a threat to civilians.
The lack of understanding of Afghan culture, traditions, and institutions 
negatively influenced the attempts to build a strong government. "A 
strong central government has not been part of the history of Afghani-
stan"28 since tribes and clans were run by the tribal elders and local insti-
tutions. A possible alternative could be the establishment of a decisional 
body with representatives elected by villages and ethnic groups. The 
chance to be represented fairly by trusted members of different minorities 
could reassure local populations and make them feel more secure and 
willing to collaborate with the government. The Taliban were supported 
by the locals not because of ideology, but because they were strong 
enough to exert a coercive power that the official government lacked. 
Therefore, reforms in the government to counter corruption and incom-
petence are necessary to build a valid alternative to the Taliban regime.
Second, the U.S. intervention should be primarily focused on maintaining 
the achievements through a commitment to the local population. Until 
now, the extensive use of air strikes and drones to carry out offensive 
attacks has resulted in heavy civilian casualties, raising suspicion and 
anger among many Afghans.29 The air strikes result in zero casualties 
among U.S. troops, but they are almost useless in the process of pacifying 
the country since they do not guarantee security on the ground once the 
strikes end. As Gen. McChrystal has said, "under the new strategy the air 
strikes should be used only if NATO troops were in danger of being over-
whelmed." The problem lies in establishing when troops would be consid-
ered in such danger.
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A possible alternative could be training the ANA together with U.S. troops 
in order to build confidence and support from the local military. The 
Afghan army and police should become strong enough and trusted by 
Afghans in order to replace foreign troops and enable their withdrawal in 
the near future. Moreover, while it is undeniable that several civilian 
casualties were caused by air strikes, it is also true that many resulted 
from suicide attacks perpetrated by the terrorists. Raising awareness 
among the population of the threat posed by these suicide bombers could 
shift the resentment from U.S. troops and coalition forces to the terrorist 
cells. The commitment of more troops in villages and cities should not 
result in isolation of troops from the local population.
The military should be trained on how to communicate effectively with 
locals and how to be part of the community and, therefore, be accepted as 
a friendly presence. This strategy, however, requires time, adequate 
forces, and resources. The infusion of 30,000 troops recently announced 
by President Obama seems to be aimed mainly at training Afghan forces 
in order to facilitate a U.S. withdrawal in the near future. However, this 
declaration could be counterproductive as it might undermine local sup-
port for U.S. forces, perceived as transitory and not reliable in the future 
of Afghanistan.
Third, the lack of collaboration between the United States and countries 
bordering Afghanistan has hampered U.S. efforts to stabilize the country. 
The unwillingness of the Bush Administration to revaluate its strategic 
priorities in the region after the overthrow of the Taliban caused stagna-
tion in negotiations for a comprehensive multilateral approach to Afghan-
istan.30 The prospects for stability largely depend on collaboration with 
Pakistan over the Taliban's bases along the border with Afghanistan, 
along with other players in the region. The geography of Afghanistan 
makes the country the center of gravity of the region. Unless the United 
States actively involves other regional players in the stabilization of 
Afghanistan, no long-term objectives will be achieved. A possible solution 
could be reopening the dialogue with Iran and reconsidering the role of 
Pakistan for a peace settlement with the Taliban. Al-Qaida and the Tali-
ban receive arms, and recruit and train people especially from Pakistan. A 
firmer U.S. stance toward Pakistan is needed to stop support to terrorists, 
which may produce more results than even a military campaign.
Conclusion
The U.S. strategy in Afghanistan has adopted different approaches since 
2001: From counterterrorism to counterinsurgency; from enemy-centric 
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to population-centric warfare; and, finally, from extensive use of air 
strikes to a commitment of more troops on the ground. Despite some ini-
tial achievements, the situation in Afghanistan is still complicated and far 
from being solved. The lack of a trusted government, opposition of the 
local population to foreign troops, regional interests and lack of collabora-
tion among neighbouring countries almost nullified the military results in 
overthrowing the Taliban and marginalizing al-Qaida. The change in the 
U.S. administration called for a new strategy, focused on nation-building, 
popular support, and long-term stability. It reflects a shift toward a coun-
terinsurgency approach that could achieve more positive results than a 
conventional military campaign. However, it might take many years to 
stabilize and secure Afghanistan in order to prevent al-Qaida and the Tal-
iban from gaining ground. As Larry Goodson from the U.S. Army War 
College has said, "Time is running out in Afghanistan."31
For American policy in Afghanistan to have any hope of success, it is 
necessary to learn from three lessons of the war in Afghanistan. First, U.S. 
strategy should be aimed at creating security and stability through a 
trusted government and a reliable national army. Second, U.S. strategy 
should be focused on maintaining positive results through a robust 
commitment to the local population. Finally, it should involve regional 
players in a more proactive and constructive dialogue to create a stable 
and secure regional environment that could lead to the security of 
Afghanistan.
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